In contrast to 2009, the 1918 influenza pandemic was a defining infectious disease event for a generation (1). Even during a period when epidemic polio and smallpox were common, the sharp spikes in mortality attributable to influenza that occurred between mid-1918 and 1920 stood out in every population for which reliable data are available (2). However, it was not only the number of deaths that made the 1918 pandemic unique, but also the distribution of ages of those that died: Far more young adults died relative to both children and older adults compared with other pandemics and intrapandemic seasons. In PNAS, an article by Worobey et al. ( 3) presents a new theory-backed up by robust phylogenetic evidence-of a previously overlooked mild H1 influenza pandemic in the very early 1900s. The authors also draw upon historical seroepidemiolgy results and the concept of antigenic imprinting to suggest that prior circulation of a previously unreported H1N8 strain for 10 y can explain both the number and age distribution of severe infections during the 1918 pandemic.
Evolutionary Analyses
With a large set of viral samples covering a substantial period, phylogenetic models allow us to test many different hypotheses relevant to public health. By combining known dates of isolation and time-dependent mutational models of evolution, the coalescent model (4) allows the joint estimation of dated evolutionary trees and the underlying parameters of the mutational model for all genes for which sequence data are available. Within these gene-specific phylogenies are estimates of the times of most recent common ancestor for the entire set of samples and for subsets that form clades within the tree. Modern computational approaches (5) allow the rapid testing of multiple hypotheses about the genesis of novel viruses by comparing times of most recent common ancestor between clades and between genes under a variety of detailed assumptions (6, 7).
In Worobey et al.'s report (3), the authors reexamine three key lineages of the hemagglutinin (HA) gene by drawing on recent extensions to the coalescent model that allow the average rate of evolution to vary within the same tree for viral populations assumed to be circulating in different hosts (8) . By allowing H1 in swine, birds, and humans to have different average rates of evolution, the authors are able to obtain more precise estimates of times of common ancestors than was possible previously.
Worobey et al.'s (3) results are surprising and challenge previous phylogenetic studies of the genesis of the 1918 pandemic (7, 9).
The possible contribution of a very fit set of avian internal genes to the 1918 pandemic is worrisome.
The authors estimate that the last common H1 HA ancestor of isolates from avian species and of those from humans during 1918 existed in the early 1900s. In addition, independent of the data from poultry and wild birds, Worobey et al. (3) estimate that the 1918 human pandemic HAs had a common ancestor some 10 y before the start of the pandemic. Given the extensive sensitivity analysis also reported (and currently available samples), these results constitute the best possible evidence that the key immunogenic protein of the pandemic strain had been circulating in humans for 10 y or more before the start of the pandemic. Conversely, the same robust analysis of the neuraminidase and internal genes indicates that these genes jumped to humans from wild birds and poultry just before 1918.
Infection History and Severity
The potential implications of this previously unreported human strain for the 1918 pandemic need to be interpreted against a generic conceptual model of a severe respiratory infection in a given population. We can hypothesize that what is eventually observed in the data as increased syndromic cases or excess mortality is driven by one or more of the following mechanisms: intrinsic high transmissibility of the virus causing high levels of incidence (10); intrinsic high pathogenicity of the virus causing more cases or deaths per infection (11); constant host-specific factors that affect susceptibility to a particular virus, such as a genetic predisposition (12); and factors driven by the immune history of hosts, especially the number and ordering of earlier influenza infections (13).
Worobey et al. (3) examined a number of different datasets and observations that supported the last of these broad mechanisms and suggest that it is very much the infection history of the host population that determined the severity of the 1918 influenza pandemic. The authors mention two immunological mechanisms-original antigenic sin and antigenic imprinting-that have both been used to link the seroepidemiology of influenza and agespecific case incidence in previous studies, before refining the concept of antigenic imprinting and using it as a tool to explain severity patterns in 1918. If antigenic imprinting is an important mechanism for influenza, an individual who is first infected by one particular subtype (e.g., H3N2) has lifelong reduced susceptibility to severe disease caused by that subtype. Worobey et al. refine antigenic imprinting to suggest a mechanism that can act for individual surface proteins: for example, an individual born in 1969 who would have been infected first by H3N2 would have some of the lifelong protection from severe disease during future pandemics with an H3 HA and some to pandemics with an N2 NA.
Although there is evidence in favor of antigenic imprinting during previous pandemics (13) , there are interesting data that are not consistent with it being a strong driver of population-level severity. If this Author contributions: S.R. wrote the paper.
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See companion article on page 8107. specific mechanism were important in 2009, during serological studies in Hong Kong (14, 15) we would have expected a clear signal of increased severity in those aged between 32 and 52 y of age: those leastlikely to have experienced H1N1 as a first infection. Rather, we found that the increasing risk of severe disease conditional on infection was smooth (as was the decreasing risk of infection with age) (14) . However, 2009 was not 1918 and Worobey et al. (3) describe a remarkable coherence between the sequence of pandemics before 1918 and the age-distribution of cases during that pandemic. The theory of strong antigenic imprinting motivates further individual-level observational studies, especially as the cohort of those first infected with H3N2 progress into the most at-risk age classes.
Overall Viral Fitness
One additional potential implication of these findings is that genes other than HA can have a tremendous impact on the overall fitness of viruses emergent into the human population. Or, posed as a question, why was there a pandemic in 1918 at all? Before these results, a key part of the explanation for all pandemics has been the novelty of the HA gene: it contains the dominant antigenic sites. If the HA is novel, humans have high susceptibility to the invading strain and therefore it achieves high levels of incidence. If the HA gene present in 1918 samples had been in the human population for 10 y, why did we see such large waves of cases? It seems that the most rational explanation is that the combination of NA and internal genes that jumped from birds must have had such a substantial impact on fitness that the strain was able to cause a pandemic, despite 10 y of prior exposure to the usually dominant antigenic sites. Although any comparison is clearly speculative, in light of the current evolutionary dynamics of H7N9 and related avian subtypes sharing internal genes, the possible contribution of a very fit set of avian internal genes to the 1918 pandemic is worrisome.
